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Rebutting Binary Sanity: Ohio’s Opportunity to 
Overturn Wilcox and Recognize Diminished 
Capacity in Mentally-Ill Defendants  
 
Ashley L. Moore* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1980, an Ohio jury convicted Moses J. Wilcox of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated murder despite 
hearing Dr. Ramos’s expert psychiatric testimony that 
Wilcox had an I.Q. of sixty-eight, a mental age of twelve, 
schizophrenia, and dyslexia; was psychotic though not 
“mentally ill” under the law; and was “susceptible to 
following the instructions of an authority figure.”1  
Counterintuitively, Wilcox’s array of mental and 
intellectual disabilities did not protect him from the 
prosecution’s assertion that he possessed the requisite 
intent, or mens rea, for the charged crimes. He initially 
put up a defense of insanity2, but his own expert witness, 
                                                             
 
* Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality Volume 7; Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2019; Cedarville University, B.A. 
2014. Many thanks to Professor Joseph Hoffmann for his feedback and 
guidance when this Note was still just a large collection of ideas; to the 
members both past and present of the Indiana Journal of Law & Social 
Equality for their diligent editing and cite-checking; and to my family and 
friends for their invaluable support and encouragement. I dedicate this Note 
to my brother, Alex Wesley Moore, my greatest advocate and closest friend.  
 
1 State v. Wilcox, No. 42897, 1981 WL 4959, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). 
2 The insanity test in Ohio has fluctuated in the last fifty years. Before 1969, 
Ohio used the M’Naghten rule of insanity, which requires a defendant to 
show they lacked the cognition to know right from wrong at the time of the 
crime due to a mental defect. See M’Naghten’s Case (H.L. 1843), 10 C. F. 200, 
8 Eng. Rep. 718. While the M’Naghten rule also considers the defendant’s 
ability to understand the nature of their actions, it does not take into account 
volition, or a person’s inability to control their conduct even when cognition 
might be present. See id. The American Law Institute’s version, on the other 
hand, takes both cognition and volition into account. MODEL PENAL CODE § 
4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if 
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”) (brackets 
in original). In 1969, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded its insanity defense 
to include a volition prong, stating, “In order to establish the defense of 
insanity, the accused must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
disease or other defect of his mind had so impaired his reason that, at the 
time of the criminal act with which he is charged, either he did not know that 
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Dr. Ramos, defeated it when she testified that despite his 
conditions, he was sane at the time of 
crime.3Subsequently, Wilcox attempted to use the 
evidence of his mental state to prove he did not have the 
capacity to form the required intent, a defense based on 
the diminished capacity doctrine. 4 
However, the trial court rejected this defense and 
ruled that Wilcox could not use Dr. Ramos’ testimony for 
any purpose besides determining whether he was insane 
at the time of the crime.5 In the trial court’s opinion, the 
fact that Wilcox was neither drunk nor legally insane 
excluded from consideration any other form of diminished 
capacity.6 The appellate court disagreed,7 but the Ohio 
Supreme Court reversed and upheld Wilcox’s conviction.8 
Maintaining a bright-line standard for sanity, the court 
held that defendants may not use psychiatric evidence to 
negate mens rea or assert a partial responsibility 
                                                             
such act was wrong or he did not have the ability to refrain from doing that 
act.” State v. Staten, N.E.2d 293, 299 (1969); see also State v. Wilcox, 436 
N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ohio 1982) (“While this standard is arguably less expansive 
than that espoused by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, see Section 4.01, 
it is considerably more flexible than the M’Naghten rule.”) (citation omitted). 
This test was in place in 1980 when Wilcox went to trial. In 1997, Ohio 
adopted its current version of the insanity defense, requiring that defendants 
prove that “at the time of the commission of the offense, the person did not 
know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the 
person’s acts.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14). Because Ohio’s current 
insanity defense allows only for a defendant’s lack of knowing the 
“wrongfulness” of their actions—and not also the “nature” of their conduct, 
like the original M’Naghten rule allowed—it is the most restrictive version of 
the insanity test still held to be constitutional under Clark v. Arizona. 548 
U.S. 735 (2006) (ruling constitutional Arizona’s narrowing of its insanity test 
by removing the question of whether a mental defect prevented a defendant 
from understanding what they were doing at the time of the crime).  
3 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *8.    
4 See discussion infra Part I. 
5 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *8. 
6 Id. at *10.  
7 Id. In a split decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District 
relied on arguments from other cases at the time stating that a defendant’s 
legal sanity does not preclude the defendant’s inability to form the statutorily 
required intent. The appellate court declared that the trial court’s denial of 
this defense was reversible error, echoing the Seventh Circuit’s position in a 
similar case: “We are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, that the 
psychiatric testimony offered could not have proven that the petitioner was 
incapable of forming specific intent.” Id. at 10 (quoting Hughes v. Matthews, 
576 F.2d 1250, 1259 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
8 State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1982). 
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defense.9 Its reasoning was two-fold: (1) psychiatric 
evidence can be confusing and untrustworthy and is 
therefore inadmissible short of determining insanity, and 
(2) sanity itself is a binary concept—a  jury that fails to 
find a defendant insane may consider the defendant 
entirely sane.10 The court reasoned that between the 
availability of the insanity defense and the mitigation 
process in sentencing, the state of Ohio already provided 
adequate safeguards for those with mental health 
issues.11  
In August 2017, Harvard Law’s Fair Punishment 
Project released a report about the twenty-six men then-
scheduled for execution in Ohio, stating that at least one 
of the follow factors was true of the defendant at the time 
they committed the crime: had a mental illness; had an 
intellectual or cognitive disability or brain damage; had a 
background of significant childhood trauma, including 
extensive physical or sexual abuse; or were under the age 
of twenty-one.12 Specifically, the report noted that Ronald 
Phillips—whom Ohio put to death in July 2017 after 
taking a three-year hiatus from executions following a 
botched lethal injection13—“had the intellectual 
functioning of a juvenile, had a father who sexually 
abused him, and grew up a victim of and witness to 
unspeakable physical abuse.”14 Since the report’s release, 
Ohio has also executed Gary Otte15, who committed his 
                                                             
9 Id. at 533. As will be explained in Part I, the diminished capacity doctrine 
encompasses two main defenses, and though the Ohio Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected just one in its holding, it also implicitly rejected the other 
in its dicta. 
10 See id. at 530. The court lays out several reasons for rejecting defenses of 
diminished capacity, but they all stem from these two premises.  
11 Id. at 527 (“Having satisfied ourselves that Ohio’s test for criminal 
responsibility adequately safeguards the rights of the insane, we are 
disinclined to adopt an alternative defense that could swallow up the insanity 
defense and its attendant commitment provisions.”).  
12 The Fair Punishment Project, New Report: Prisoners on Ohio’s Execution 
List Defined by Intellectual Impairment, Mental Illness, Trauma, and Young 
Age, FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT (Aug. 29, 2017), 
http://fairpunishment.org/prisoners-on-ohios-execution-list/#_ftn1.   
13 Eric Levenson & AnneClaire Stapleton, Ohio Carries Out First Execution 
Since 2014, CNN (July 26, 2017, 3:19 PM) 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26/us/ohio-execution-ronald-phillips/index.html.  
14 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12. 
15 Execution List 2017, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2019), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2017. In 2018, Ohio also executed 
Robert Van Hook. Execution List 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 
(2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2018. On February 19, 
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crime when he was just twenty years old.16 According to 
the Fair Punishment Project, Otte also suffered from 
chronic depression and had “psychological problems, 
developmental delays, learning disabilities, and was 
emotionally handicapped.”17 
The disproportionate number of Ohio death row 
inmates with significant mental health issues is 
incongruent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s assumption 
in Wilcox that mentally ill defendants are sufficiently 
protected by either the insanity defense or sentence 
mitigation. Some Ohioans evidently agree—in February 
2017, Ohio Senate Bill 40 and Ohio House Bill 81 were 
both introduced to amend relevant sections of Ohio’s 
Revised Code to exclude from capital sentencing any 
person convicted of aggravated murder who can show they 
suffered from a statutorily defined “serious mental 
illness” at the time that they committed the crime.18 Both 
bills are currently in committee, though discussion in this 
Note is limited to Senate Bill 40 (S.B. 40). 
While capital defendants garner more public 
attention than noncapital defendants like Wilcox,19 
noncapital defendants confront the exact same barriers to 
justice when courts overlook their mental disorders and 
attribute culpability where it could not have existed. In 
2017, the U.S. Department of Justice released a special 
report, based on data collected between February 2011 
                                                             
2019, following a ruling by U.S. District Court Judge Michael Merz 
questioned the constitutionality of Ohio’s execution method, Governor Mike 
DeWine announced a halt to further executions until the state improves its 
lethal injection protocol. Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine stops 
executions, wants new protocol, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Feb 19, 2019), 
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/ohio-
gov-mike-dewine-stops-executions-wants-new-
protocol/1CvQOUD9itSaRYz1FiTBsN/. 
16 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12  
17 Id. 
18 S.B. 40, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017), 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-
SB-40 (proposing statutory definitions for “serious mental illnesses”); H.B. 
81, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017), 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-
HB-81.  
19 Though his aggravated murder conviction would normally have rendered 
him eligible for the death penalty, Wilcox’s trial came after Ohio’s original 
death penalty statute was declared unconstitutional, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586 (1978), and before the next iteration of Ohio’s death penalty statute 
was enacted. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 528. Wilcox did, however, receive a life 
sentence. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 524. 
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and May 2012, stating that 14% of state and federal 
prisoners and 26% of jail inmates experienced “serious 
psychological distress.”20 Though these statistics rely on 
self-reported symptoms, the study also reported that “37% 
of prisoners and 44% of jail inmates had been told in the 
past by a mental health professional that they had a 
mental disorder.”21 Likewise, Ohio’s former Director of 
Rehabilitation and Corrections, Gary Mohr, stated in 
2015 that out of the 20,000 people entering the corrections 
system each year, about 20% of them had diagnosed 
mental illnesses that required treatment.22  
In short, the legal fiction of binary sanity means 
that defendants who cannot succeed with an insanity 
defense23 are considered entirely sane during the guilt 
phase of a trial and are unable to present any psychiatric 
evidence to show otherwise. Moreover, outside the context 
of the insanity defense, the law has strictly separated the 
concepts of sanity and intent,24 almost always to the 
detriment of the mentally ill.25 So these defendants—with 
mental impairments not significant enough to constitute 
legal insanity, yet serious enough to impair their 
rationality26 and raise doubts about their ability to form 
                                                             
20 JENNIFER BRONSON AND MARCUS BERZOFSKY, INDICATORS OF MENTAL 
HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-12 (2017). 
21 Id. 
22 Karen Kasler, Prisons Now Largest Mental Health Provider in Ohio, OHIO 
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.wyso.org/post/prisons-now-largest-
mental-health-provider-ohio. 
23 See discussion supra note 2. 
24 See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no 
necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental 
elements of the crime.”); see also State v. Curry, 543 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ohio 
1989) (“While it is true that a legally insane defendant may lack the capacity 
to form the specific intent to commit a crime, criminal intent or lack thereof is 
not the focus of the insanity question.”).     
25 See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 378 
(1994) (arguing that capital murder statutes effectively turn certain forms of 
aggravated murder into strict liability crimes by shifting the sentencing 
authority’s focus from deciding on mens rea to pointing out external 
aggravating factors); Fredrick E. Vars, When God Spikes Your Drink: Guilty 
Without Mens Rea, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 216 (2013) (disagreeing with 
Michigan’s rejection of the diminished capacity defense, especially in light of 
many states’ permitted intoxication defenses) (“Excluding mental health 
evidence on intent, even prospectively, is indefensible. The new rule barring 
such evidence did not really eliminate a ‘defense’—it effectively created a new 
set of crimes for the mentally ill that do not require a finding of intent.”).  
26 See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Rationality, Insanity, and the Insanity Defense: 
Reflections on the Limits of Reason, 39 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 161, 168–69 
(2014–2015) (“The existence of simple cognition—a thin version of 
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the requisite intent—cannot respond to the State’s mens 
rea case with evidence about these impairments. Instead, 
they must wait until after conviction, when any 
mitigating evidence of mental illness they can present has 
already lost most of its weight. At this point, 
unfortunately, even the best-case scenario of sentence 
reduction cannot make up for the injustice of incurring a 
conviction based on the false premise that a mentally ill 
defendant is “entirely sane.”27   
Therefore, this Note maintains that the legal fiction 
of binary sanity promulgated by Ohio courts since Wilcox 
creates a cognitive dissonance between one’s legal 
culpability, as determined by a jury, and the debilitating 
effects of mental illness in real life. It further argues that 
although the public is aware of this cognitive dissonance, 
it has chosen to pursue reforms that focus only on capital 
defendants and fail to challenge the courts’ problematic 
adherence to bright-line standards of sanity with respect 
to noncapital defendants. This Note supports the passage 
of S.B. 40, however, to the extent that it includes 
language that could not only blur these lines (even if only 
for capital defendants) but also present an opportunity for 
the courts to reexamine Wilcox. Ultimately, this Note 
contends that overturning Wilcox and opening the door to 
the doctrine of diminished capacity are the most effective 
reforms to protect both capital and noncapital mentally ill 
defendants; it, furthermore, urges Ohio to adopt these 
reforms and give these defendants the chance to introduce 
psychiatric evidence short of insanity during the guilt 
phases of their trials.  
Part I will begin by orienting the reader to the 
diminished capacity defense and associated terminology. 
It will then establish the cause of the cognitive dissonance 
by first, explaining the specific ways the Wilcox court 
blocked this defense, and second, using death row inmate 
David Sneed’s case to contrast the Wilcox reasoning with 
its real-world implications. Part II will delve further into 
the measures taken by the United States and Ohio to 
address this disconnect before examining the language of 
                                                             
instrumental reality—should be an insufficient criterion, standing alone, for 
finding sanity. Motivation, informed by human emotions, produces insane 
conduct and insane crimes even when some modest form of cognition—the 
ability to effectuate a simply syllogism, for example—is apparently 
retained.”).  
27 See Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 529-530.  
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S.B. 40 and analyzing its potential impact on criminal 
trials in Ohio. Part III will then discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of this bill in comparison with those of the 
diminished capacity defense, and it will predict that Ohio 
lawmakers might have to choose between passing this bill 
or upholding Wilcox. Finally, this Note will conclude with 
a return to Wilcox’s story to show that Ohioans cannot 
truly resolve this cognitive dissonance unless they allow 
mentally ill defendants to assert the defense of 
diminished capacity.  
 
I. CREATING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
  
A. A Definition of Diminished Capacity Defenses 
  
Before grappling with the holding of Wilcox, it is 
necessary to clarify the concepts of intent, culpability, and 
diminished capacity, as applied in the context of criminal 
proceedings and used in this Note. The U.S. Supreme 
Court held in In re Winship that “the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”28 
Therefore, to secure a conviction, the prosecution must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a crime, 
including mens rea.29 Because criminal intent is so 
subjective, courts have generally allowed the State to 
prove its existence using circumstantial evidence through 
an objective theory of criminal liability, which presumes 
that all defendants are sane and possess equal capacity to 
form intent.30 Circumstantial evidence used to infer intent 
could include the nature of the offense; the weapons used, 
                                                             
28 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
29 Id. See also Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished 
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1984) [hereinafter, Morse, 
Undiminished Confusion]. The only exception to this requirement is where 
the crime is a “strict liability” crime, meaning the statute does not include an 
element of intent. 
30 Harlow M. Huckabee, Avoiding the Insanity Defense Straight Jacket: The 
Mens Rea Route, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987); see also Clark v. Arizona, 548 
U.S. 735, 766–67 (2006) (“This presumption [of sanity] dispenses with a 
requirement on the government’s part to include as an element of every 
criminal charge an allegation that the defendant had such a capacity.”).  
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if any; or even the relationship between the victim and 
the defendant.31 
 The doctrine of diminished capacity refers to the 
mechanism through which a defendant may introduce 
psychiatric evidence short of insanity to reduce 
culpability.32 For the purpose of this Note, I will 
distinguish “legal culpability” from “moral culpability.” 
“Legal culpability” will refer to the culpability a jury 
places on defendants when convicting them of the charged 
crimes in the guilt phase of a trial. A finding of legal 
culpability means that the State has proved the intent 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt; however, 
because legal culpability is assessed before the 
introduction of mitigating psychiatric evidence, a jury 
may base its finding on the potentially false assumption 
that the defendant is entirely sane. In contrast, I will use 
“moral culpability” to refer to the responsibility a judge or 
jury ascribes to a defendant once they have heard 
evidence of mental illness or impairment and are no 
longer constrained by the legal fiction of binary sanity.  
It is important to keep in mind that the assessment 
of moral culpability might result in a sentence reduction33 
or exemption (such as in death penalty cases)34, but it 
cannot reach backwards to undermine the conviction of 
guilt which opened the door to a particular sentencing 
range in the first place. Where mitigation currently 
remains limited to adjusting sentences according to moral 
culpability, a defense of diminished capacity may reduce 
either moral or legal culpability. Therefore, a diminished 
capacity defense may cut against the law’s strict 
                                                             
31 J. Thomas Sullivan, The Culpability, or Mens Rea, “Defense” in Arkansas, 
53 ARK. L. REV. 805, 810 (2000).  
32 The various concepts this doctrine encompasses can be confusing to track, 
and scholars and courts have not helped by consistently using different 
terms. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, “diminished capacity” or 
“diminished capacity defense” will refer to the doctrine as a whole. I will also 
use “diminished capacity” more when discussing Wilcox because this is the 
term that courts most frequently use. See infra note 38 and accompanying 
text.  
33 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12 (C) (“The sentencing court shall 
consider . . . relevant factors, as indicating that the offender’s conduct is less 
serious than conduct normally constituting the offense . . . . (4) There are 
substantial grounds to mitigate the offender’s conduct, although the grounds 
are not enough to constitute a defense.”). 
34 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (West 2018) (explaining the 
process by which juries may choose not to sentence a capital defendant to 
death based statutory aggravating and mitigating factors). 
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separation of sanity from intent as well as blur the “bright 
lines” surrounding the fiction of binary sanity.  
The diminished capacity doctrine encompasses two 
models: the partial responsibility variant and the mens 
rea variant.35 Partial responsibility is “a mitigation 
concept which has the effect of reducing the degree of 
crime and, hence, reducing the punishment.”36 
Specifically, courts employing this doctrine allow juries to 
treat a defendant’s mental abnormality as a formal 
mitigating factor and reduce either the crime’s degree or 
the punishment to be imposed based on the belief that the 
defendant is less responsible than somebody without a 
mental abnormality who violates the same statute.37 
Unlike the second variant of diminished capacity, partial 
responsibility does not require any causal connection 
between a psychiatric disorder and a missing mens rea 
element.38 The existence of a mental illness or cognitive 
disability alone is sufficient to reduce responsibility as an 
affirmative defense. The partial responsibility defense is a 
legal excuse, operating in the same way as the insanity 
defense; however, where the insanity defense completely 
excuses a defendant from responsibility, partial 
responsibility does not.39  Ohio’s S.B. 40 likely falls into 
the category of introducing a partial responsibility excuse, 
though some of its language also implicates the mens rea 
model.40  
                                                             
35 Again, for clarity, I will echo Morse and use “partial responsibility” or “the 
partial responsibility variant” to refer to the diminished capacity affirmative 
defense premised on mental abnormality. Morse, Undiminished Confusion, 
supra note 29, at 1. I will use “the mens rea variant” or “the mens rea model” 
to refer to the diminished capacity “failure of proof” defense which ties 
mental abnormality to missing intent to defeat the prosecution’s prima facie 
case. For comparison’s sake, Arenella and others sometimes use “diminished 
responsibility” or “the formal mitigation model” to refer to partial 
responsibility. See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished 
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 827, 828–29 (1977). Morse notes that the mens rea variant is often 
mischaracterized as “the defense of diminished capacity.” Stephen J. Morse, 
Symposium, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 920 (2011) [hereinafter Morse, Mental Disorder].  
36 Huckabee, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
37 See Arenella, supra note 35, at 829.  
38 Gary O. Sommer, Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility: 
Irreconcilable Doctrines Confused in State v. Wilcox, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1399, 
1408–09 (1983).  
39 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 925 (“Legal insanity is an 
affirmative, complete defense to crime.”). 
40 See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.B.  
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Contrary to partial responsibility, the mens rea 
variant is not an affirmative defense but rather 
equivalent to a plea of “not guilty” of the crime charged.41 
It is a “failure of proof” defense42 with which the 
defendant is “straightforwardly denying the prosecution’s 
. . . claim that a requisite mental element was present at 
the time of the offense.”43 Unlike partial responsibility, 
the mens rea variant treats all defendants alike but 
requires proof that “a sane defendant’s mental 
abnormality at the time of the crime” prevented the 
formation of the requisite intent.44 Jurisdictions that 
allow this model usually limit it to crimes of specific 
intent, though it could apply to any crime requiring mens 
rea proof.45 A successful diminished capacity defense 
under the mens rea model theoretically results in full 
acquittal, though practically, it usually reduces the 
offense charged to one that does not require proof of 
specific intent.46 Scholars have divided the mens rea 
model into two main forms: “strict mens rea,” which 
allows psychiatric evidence to show the defendant did not 
in fact possess the requisite mens rea at the time of the 
crime, and “diminished mens rea,” which allows the same 
evidence to prove the defendant lacks the capacity to form 
the requisite mens rea and therefore did not possess it at 
the time of the crime.47  
Professor Peter Arenella explains that the strict 
mens rea approach is unlikely to serve a purpose outside 
the context of insanity because of how difficult it is to 
negate intent.48 Even when a defendant is found to be 
legally insane, the state can almost always still prove 
intent.49 Therefore, very little evidence would be relevant 
                                                             
41 See Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 29, at 6. 
42 Sommer, supra note 38, at 1403. 
43 Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 29, at 6. 
44 Arenella, supra note 35, at 828. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 829. 
47 See Sommer, supra note 38, at 1404–06. Some scholars refer to these forms 
as the “strict” approach and the “diminished capacity” approach which could 
obviously be confused for the overall doctrine of diminished capacity. 
Therefore, I have adopted Sommer’s simple classification to make it clear 
that “strict mens rea” and “diminished mens rea” are both subsets of the mens 
rea model of diminished capacity.  
48 See Arenella, supra note 35, at 834. 
49 See Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 906 n. 69; see also, e.g., Clark 
v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745, 756 (2006) (finding intent despite the fact the 
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to come in under this approach. The diminished mens rea 
approach, however, can sometimes look like partial 
responsibility because it allows “all evidence tending to 
show that the defendant was less capable than an 
ordinary defendant of entertaining the requisite intent.”50 
Arenella argues that this approach allows the admission 
of almost unlimited psychiatric evidence as long as expert 
witnesses can claim a defendant’s mental abnormality 
impairs cognition or conduct.51 In the 1960s, California 
shifted its strict mens rea approach to a diminished one, 
and the result was that expert testimony also shifted from 
using psychiatric evidence to prove the absence of 
requisite intent to using it to explain why defendants 
possessed the requisite intent.52   
Against this backdrop of complicated nomenclature, 
the Wilcox court confused these terms—while its holding 
explicitly rejected the diminished mens rea form of the 
diminished capacity defense, it does not clarify if it is also 
barring the strict mens rea version, and its arguments 
extend the ban to partial responsibility as well.53 
 
B. The Ohio Supreme Court’s Rejection of 
Diminished Capacity Defenses 
 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s main reason for 
reversing the appellate court was that by relying on State 
v. Nichols54 to claim that Ohio recognized a diminished 
capacity defense, the lower court had ignored a more 
recent case55 in which the state supreme court formally 
considered and rejected the defense.56 Though the 
supreme court’s holding explicitly barred a defendant’s 
ability to “offer expert psychiatric testimony, unrelated to 
                                                             
defendant’s schizophrenia caused him to believe that he was killing aliens, 
not police officers). 
50 Arenella, supra note 35, at 835.  
51 See id.  
52 Id. at 831 (“Because these psychiatric explanations of the defendant’s 
actions invite the jury to treat the accused’s mental disability as a formal 
mitigating factor, the result was the creation of a partial defense 
indistinguishable from the diminished responsibility model.”). 
53 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
54 209 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965). 
55 See Ohio v. Jackson, 291 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Ohio 1972), superseded by 
statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (West 2018), as recognized in Ohio v. 
Humphries, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio 1977).  
56See Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 524.  
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the insanity defense, to show that the defendant lacked 
the mental capacity to form the specific mental state 
required for a particular crime or degree of crime,”57 its 
reasoning seemed to switch from rejecting both forms of 
the diminished capacity defense to likewise barring future 
claims of partial responsibility.58 
The Wilcox court began with a brief history of 
partial responsibility and the mens rea model, 
unknowingly blending them together and referring to 
them as “the diminished capacity defense.”59 It next listed 
the following justifications for the diminished capacity 
defense: (1) it helps make up for the limitations of a 
flawed insanity test; (2) it allows a jury to avoid 
sentencing to death convicted murderers who are 
mentally disabled; (3) it allows for more accurate and 
individualized assessments of culpability; and (4) it is 
congruent with some jurisdictions’ acceptance of evidence 
of intoxication to negate specific intent.60 The court then 
proceeded to refute each of these justifications in turn 
before ending with a final pronouncement against 
diminished capacity based on California’s failed attempts 
to implement a sustainable diminished capacity 
doctrine.61 
Addressing the first justification, the court 
reasoned that while diminished capacity might ameliorate 
the M’Naghten version of the insanity test62, Ohio 
actually used a more liberal test, and this fact precluded  
the need for a partial responsibility option.63 Additionally, 
                                                             
57 Id. at 533. 
58 See Sommer, supra note 38, at 1400.  
59 Id. at 525. 
60 Id. at 525–26 (paraphrasing Arenella, supra note 35 at 853).  
61 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 
530–531 (“The California courts struggled to evolve a coherent diminished 
capacity framework but the difficulties inherent in the doctrine, e.g., its 
subjectivity, its non-uniform and exotic terminology, its open-endedness, and 
its quixotic results in particular cases, were not overcome . . . .”). For the sake 
of concision, I will focus only on the Ohio Supreme Court’s first four reasons 
for rejecting the defenses of diminished capacity, as the court’s discussion of 
California’s experience serves merely as an illustration of the Wilcox court’s 
reasoning. Furthermore, this example of California in the 1960’s less relevant 
to a discussion of Ohio policy in 2019. 
62 See discussion supra note 2 (explaining the various insanity tests that have 
been used, particularly in Ohio). 
63 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 526–27 (“The ameliorative argument loses much of 
its force, however, in jurisdictions that have abandoned or expanded upon the 
narrow M’Naghten standard . . . . Thus we see no reason to fashion a halfway 
measure, e.g., diminished capacity, when an accused may present a 
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the court worried that defendants would opt for using a 
diminished capacity defense over insanity in order to 
avoid indefinite commitment and get reduced prison 
time.64 It is unclear why the court assumed that the same 
defendants would qualify for both insanity and all forms 
of diminished capacity, but this argument fits in with the 
court’s overarching desire to keep the insanity 
determination an “all-or-nothing” concept.65  
The court quickly dismissed the death penalty 
justification by first, noting that recent legislation had 
created a smaller group of capital crimes, and second, 
mentioning that evidence of mental illness could now 
come in as a formal mitigation factor in the newly 
bifurcated proceedings.66 It is worth noting that even as 
the court maintained no other mitigation outside the 
insanity defense was needed, it admitted the need to 
bring in evidence of mental capacity at some point in a 
capital trial.67  
The court wove its final two points together to 
address the feasibility of using diminished capacity for 
“more accurate, individualized culpability judgments.”68    
While the court responded specifically to the analogies 
drawn between diminished capacity and, in turn, the 
insanity defense and intoxication excuse, it is difficult to 
separate its rationale here from its language throughout 
the entire decision.69 Namely, this section—heavily 
comprised of language from other courts and experts—
most clearly elaborates the two premises undergirding 
Wilcox: (1) an inherent distrust of psychological or 
                                                             
meaningful insanity defense in a proper case.”); see also discussion supra note 
2 (explaining that during Wilcox’s trial, Ohio had an insanity test in place 
that was more flexible than the M’Naughten rule yet not as broad as the 
Model Penal Code’s test).   
64 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527. 
65 Id. at 529 (“Theoretically the insanity concept operates as a bright line test 
separating the criminally responsible from the criminally irresponsible. The 
diminished capacity concept on the other hand posits a series of rather blurry 
lines representing gradations of culpability.”) (citation omitted).  
66 Id. at 527–28.  
67 Id. at 528 (“Mental capacity is a formal mitigating factor in capital cases 
under current Ohio law at the punishment stage of the now bifurcated 
proceedings. Thus the ameliorative purpose served by the diminished 
capacity defense in capital cases has largely been accomplished by other 
means.”). 
68 Id. 
69 Id.; see also infra notes 141 and 142. 
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psychiatric evidence,70 and (2) a strong desire to maintain 
the “bright-line” dichotomy between sanity and insanity.71 
According to the court, it is too difficult for juries to 
separate the “reasonable” or “responsible” legally sane 
defendants from the “unreasonable” or “less responsible” 
ones, which is why the law created the fiction of legal 
insanity in the first place.72 The court wrote: 
In light of the linedrawing difficulties courts 
and juries face when assessing expert evidence 
to make the ‘bright line’ insanity 
determination, we are not at all confident that 
similar evidence will enable juries, or the 
judges who must instruct them, to bring the 
blurred lines of diminished capacity into proper 
focus so as to facilitate principled and 
consistent decision-making in criminal cases.73 
 
The language echoes the court’s first point 
regarding the sufficiency of the insanity defense, 
and the court reiterates these points when turning 
to how diminished capacity was implemented in 
California.74 
In short, the main obstacle for criminal 
defendants with mental illnesses that do not 
amount to legal insanity is not the court’s denial 
                                                             
70 Id. at 529 (“While some courts may have blind faith in all phases of 
psychiatry, this court does not. There is substantial doubt whether evidence 
such as was sought to be introduced here is scientifically sound, and there is 
substantial legal doubt that it is probative on the point for which it was 
asserted in this case.”) (quoting Steele v. State, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13 (Wis. 
1980)). 
71 Id. at 528 (“‘The essence of the diminished capacity concept . . . is that the 
circumstance of mental deficiency should not be confined to use as an all-or-
nothing defense. It is true, of course, that the existence of the required state 
of mind is to be determined subjectively . . . according to the particular 
circumstances of a given case. However, this fact may not be allowed to 
obscure the critical difference between the legal concepts of mens rea and 
insanity.’”)(quoting Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 86-88 (D.C. Cir. 
1976)). 
72 Id. at 529 (“‘The line between the sane and the insane for purposes of 
criminal adjudication is not drawn because for one group the actual existence 
of the necessary mental state (or lack thereof) can be determined with any 
greater certainty, but rather because those whom the law declares insane are 
demonstrably so aberrational in their psychiatric characteristics that we 
choose to make the assumption that they are incapable of possessing the 
specified state of mind.’”) (quoting Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 87 
(D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
73 Id. at 530. 
74 See supra note 61 (quoting the court’s language about California). 
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that diminished capacity exists, but rather the 
court’s aversion to trusting psychologists with their 
juries, or perhaps, juries with psychologists. Yet 
while the court emphasizes the risk of the legally 
insane “taking advantage”75 of the diminished 
capacity defense, it fails to consider legally sane 
defendants who, nonetheless, suffer cognitive or 
volitional impairments due to mental illness. It is 
understandable that psychiatric evidence would be 
difficult to fit inside this court’s bright lines, but 
the question remains, why should these fictional 
lines take priority over the real experiences of 
people whose mental illnesses fall along a 
spectrum?  
Additionally, as Sommer points out, the 
court undermines its own holding by confusing the 
concepts of partial responsibility and the mens rea 
variant.76 Morse agrees that this reasoning is 
actually a rejection of partial responsibility because 
at its core, it is a refusal to allow any defense 
besides insanity to consider non-responsibility 
based on mental abnormality.77 Regardless, Wilcox 
continues to be authoritative law in Ohio, along 
with the court’s  tendency to disbelieve psychiatric 
evidence and its resolve to make the insanity 
determination an either/or decision. It is on this 
expansive platform, rather than its narrow holding, 
that Wilcox bars the doctrine of diminished 
capacity as a whole and presents a potential 
obstacle to S.B. 40.  
 
C. The Real-World Implications of Wilcox Logic 
 
In most American jurisdictions, defendants do not 
have the option to present a diminished capacity defense, 
so they must rely on either the insanity defense or 
sentence mitigation to give them the opportunity to 
introduce psychiatric evidence showing reduced 
culpability. But despite the Wilcox court’s contention, 
neither option provides significant protection. Contrary to 
                                                             
75 Id. at 527 (“[T]he principal practical effect of the diminished capacity 
defense is to enable mentally ill offenders to receive shorter and more certain 
sentences than they would receive if they were adjudged insane.”).  
76 Sommer, supra note 38, at 1400.  
77 Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 29, at 7–8, n. 19. 
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public perception, the insanity defense is rarely raised, is 
raised in just one percent of felony cases, is used nearly 
twice as often in nonhomicide cases than in homicide 
cases, and when raised, is successful only one quarter of 
the time.78 A defendant claiming insanity does so as an 
affirmative defense—even when successful, it does not 
negate the prosecution’s ability to prove the elements of a 
crime, as the mens rea model of diminished culpability 
could do. Instead, a successful insanity defense results in 
the defendant’s exemption from criminal responsibility.79  
The insanity defense is one of the few recognized excuses 
for criminal culpability.80 As Morse notes, however, 
“[e]xcuse is warranted only in those cases in which the 
impairment is sufficient, which is a moral and legal 
question,” and not a question of medicine or psychology.81  
Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gregg v. Georgia,82 states like Ohio do allow psychiatric 
evidence to come in at the sentencing phase of capital 
trials as mitigating factors, but juries have full discretion 
over the amount of weight to place on such evidence,83 
and sometimes this evidence can be a double-edged sword 
actually increasing a jury’s likelihood to impose the death 
sentence.84 Moreover, there is no separate sentencing 
                                                             
78 Tyler Ellis, Comment, Mental Illness, Legal Culpability, & Due Process: 
Why the Fourteenth Amendment Allows States to Choose a Mens Rea Insanity 
Defense Over a M’Naghten Approach, 84 MISS. L.J. 215, 238, nn.141–42 
(2014).  
79 State v. Curry, 543 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ohio 1989)  (“Conversely, where the 
state has proved every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including the mental element, the accused may present evidence that he was 
insane at the time of the offense and thus should not be held criminally 
responsible.”). See also Sommer, supra note 30, at 1402. 
80 Others include self-defense or “accidental killing” for homicide and duress 
or coercion in nonhomicide cases. Ronald A. Case, Annotation, Homicide: 
Burden of Proof on Defense that Killing was Accidental, 63 A.L.R.3d 936 
(1975); L.I. Reiser, Annotation, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress as Defense to 
Criminal Prosecution, 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955). 
81 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35 at 926.  
82 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding constitutional the bifurcated 
nature of capital trials which separates the guilt phase from the sentencing 
phase so long as the sentencing authority had sufficient information and 
guidance so as not to result in the “arbitrary and capricious” imposition of the 
death penalty). 
83 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (West 2018). 
84 Richard J. Bonnie, Mental Illness, Diminished Responsibility, and the 
Death Penalty: A New Frontier, 42 HUM. RIGHTS MAG. (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazi
ne_home/2016-17-vol-42/vol--42--no--2---the-death-penalty--how-far-have-we-
come-/mental-illness--diminished-responsibility--and-the-death-penalty/ 
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phase in noncapital cases—a judge has full discretion over 
how much weight to afford mitigating evidence such as 
mental health. As explained in the Introduction, by the 
time that psychiatric evidence comes out to mitigate a 
sentence in either a capital or noncapital trial, it has 
already lost the weight that it could have had in trial 
because now it must go up against a conviction.  
David Sneed’s story demonstrates the shortcomings 
in the Wilcox court’s reasoning that Ohio sufficiently 
protects mentally ill defendants. While Wilcox himself 
was not actually facing the death penalty, the uncanny 
similarities between his case and Sneed’s demonstrate 
that the court was considering a defendant like Sneed 
when it assessed that there were enough protections in 
capital cases to not need a diminished capacity defense.85 
While Sneed’s case alone is not sufficient to overturn the 
reasoning in the court’s two premises86, it does start to 
unravel the court’s logic as it shows how misguided the 
court was in assuming that the insanity defense87 and 
mitigation phase were enough to provide mentally-ill 
capital defendants with a fair trial.    
                                                             
(“Some attorneys will choose not to present highly relevant evidence of 
mental illness because of fear that jurors will not consider it, or will view it as 
evidence of future dangerousness rather than diminished moral culpability. . 
. . Indeed, the Court [in Atkins v. Virginia] worried that because of this 
‘double-edged sword’ phenomenon, which applies equally to those with 
intellectual disabilities, those who had the lowest moral culpability and were 
the least deserving of execution were actually more likely to be sentenced to 
death.”). 
85 As the following paragraphs will relate, both Wilcox and Sneed were 
convicted of aggravated murder, though Sneed was also convicted of 
aggravated robbery where Wilcox’s second conviction was aggravated 
burglary. Both defendants were initially determined to be incompetent to 
stand trial, but were later found to be competent. Moreover, both defendants 
suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and other issues related to 
organic brain damage. Though Sneed was a principal offender and faced the 
death penalty where Wilcox was and did not, neither defendant was able to 
use the insanity defense in the manner the Wilcox court intended when it 
stated, “[W]e see no reason to fashion a halfway measure, e.g., diminished 
capacity, when an accused may present a meaningful insanity defense in a 
proper case.” Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527. Therefore, both defendants’ only 
remaining options were to introduce psychiatric evidence to either reduce 
responsibility or prove missing criminal intent. And both defendants were 
barred from doing so.  
86 See supra notes 70 and 71 and accompanying text. 
87 In 1986, Ohio was still using the more liberal insanity test that was used 
during Wilcox’s trial. See discussion supra note 2. 
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David Sneed is on Ohio’s death row for aggravated 
murder and aggravated robbery.88 On November 19, 1984, 
Sneed and a companion hitched a ride from a twenty-six-
year-old man and then demanded money from him at 
gunpoint.89 When the driver refused, Sneed and his 
companion each shot the driver in the head, resulting in 
his death.90 Sneed’s accomplice eventually confessed and 
avoided the death penalty by signing a plea deal,91 but the 
jury found Sneed guilty of all charges and recommended 
the death penalty, which the trial court adopted and 
imposed.92 
Drawing on facts recorded by the state and federal 
courts in their decisions denying Sneed’s appeals, 
Harvard’s Fair Punishment Project describes Sneed as 
suffering from severe mental illnesses, “significantly 
below-average” intellectual abilities, and psychological 
damage from repeated physical and sexual abuse and 
neglect in his childhood.93 The jury heard much of this 
evidence in this mitigation phase, including testimony 
that his father was an alcoholic; that his mother was 
imprisoned for child endangerment, resulting in Sneed’s 
placement in foster care; that he had to relocate homes 
frequently; and that his school attendance and test scores 
were poor.94 
The jury also heard from friends, family, and 
examining psychologists that Sneed suffered from bipolar 
disorder, schizophrenia, and other personality disorders, 
and that he had gone off his medication and begun 
displaying increasingly erratic behavior before he 
committed the crime.95 When asked about how Sneed’s 
mental illness may have contributed to his crime, both Dr. 
Edward Dutton and Dr. Mijo Zakman pointed to his 
bipolar disorder and borderline intellectual functioning as 
having substantially decreased Sneed’s capacity to 
recognize the criminality of his actions.96 Despite these 
                                                             
88 State v. Sneed, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (Ohio 1992). 
89 Sneed v. Johnson, No. 1:04CV588, 2007 WL 709778, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 
2, 2007). 
90 Id. 
91 Sneed v. Johnson, 600 F.3d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 2010). 
92 Sneed, 584 N.E.2d at 1164. 
93 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12.  
94 Johnson, 2007 WL 709778, at *57–59. 
95 Id. at *48, 57–59. 
96 Sneed, 584 N.E.2d at 1174. 
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mitigating factors, the jury found that the aggravating 
circumstances tipped the scales in favor of the death 
sentence. For the purposes of developing an accurate 
portrayal of Sneed’s mental health, it is worth noting that 
the jury did not hear any evidence of sexual abuse or 
possible brain damage because these were not discovered 
until Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon examined Sneed before he 
filed his petition for post-conviction relief in 1993.97  
In this post-conviction report, Dr. Smalldon 
presented testimony from Sneed’s sister that his foster 
family had sexually abused him when he was a toddler 
and speculated that he may have been sexually abused by 
other adults as well.98 Moreover, Sneed disclosed abuse 
from at least two such adults, reporting years of repeated 
rapes and psychological torture inflicted by an “extremely 
big” male neighbor as well as encounters with a friend of 
his mother’s who would take Sneed into an abandoned 
home and pay him money to perform oral sex.99 Dr. 
Smalldon also noted that Sneed admitted that he had 
never told anyone about this abuse because he “always 
felt ‘too embarrassed and too scared.’”100 In addition to the 
egregious sexual abuse, Dr. Smalldon documented 
evidence of brain impairment; specifically, abnormal 
brain functioning contributing to Sneed’s maladaptive 
behavior.101 While Dr. Smalldon admitted in his report 
that he could not conclude with certainty how much these 
factors influenced Sneed at the time of his crime, he did 
state, “it is clear that he was decompensating.”102  
Indeed, both the evidence presented at mitigation 
and the fact that Sneed was initially declared 
incompetent for trial support Dr. Smalldon’s contention. 
According to the record, the court found Sneed 
incompetent to stand trial on April 12, 1985, after hearing 
that “Sneed had been treated for mental problems on 
three prior occasions and that personnel at the Stark 
County Sheriff’s Department had taken Sneed to the 
Massillon State Hospital since his arrest because he was 
                                                             
97 Johnson, 2007 WL 709778, at *49. 
98 Id. at *60. 
99 Id. at *59–60. 
100 Id. at *60. 
101 Id. at *61.  
102 Id. at *49 n.35.  
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behaving irrationally.”103 Sneed was also diagnosed with 
“severe manic bipolar disorder and a schizo-affective 
disorder involving hallucinations and delusions.”104 The 
court declared him competent to stand trial on February 
10, 1986, based on the fact Sneed’s condition drastically 
improved with the regular use of psychotropic 
medication.105 
Given the clear unraveling of Sneed’s mental 
capacity, one might wonder why his lawyers did not 
pursue the insanity defense. However, in its denial of 
Sneed’s habeas petition, the Sixth Circuit held that 
Sneed’s counsel was objectively reasonable in deciding 
against this defense due to the following four obstacles: 
(1) conflicting psychiatric testimony over whether Sneed 
knew the wrongfulness of his actions;106 (2) prosecutorial 
evidence that Sneed might be faking his insanity; (3) 
Sneed’s actions directly before and after the crime making 
him seem calculated; and (4) public skepticism of the 
insanity defense due to the recent unpopular trial 
outcome of John Hinckley, Jr.107 Thus, as the federal 
district court stated, “while an insanity defense was 
clearly available to counsel based on Sneed’s diagnosis of 
significant mental illness, it was by no means a perfect 
defense.”108 With an unlikely chance of success pleading 
insanity and no other recognized defense based on mental 
illness, Sneed had no choice but to reserve this evidence 
for the mitigation phase, where the jury had no obligation 
to afford it any great weight.  
Heinous though Sneed’s crime may be, the 
overwhelming amount of psychiatric evidence puts 
Sneed’s sanity and overall culpability in question, making 
him a likely candidate for exclusion from the death 
penalty should Ohio’s pending legislation pass. Both the 
                                                             
103 Id. at *34.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Ohio’s standard for insanity at the time of this case included both the 
cognition and volition prongs, see discussion supra note 2, meaning that 
Sneed’s lawyers could have also proved insanity by showing Sneed’s inability 
to conform his conduct to legal requirements even if he knew right from 
wrong. However, the Sixth Circuit noted that even though the district court 
used the wrong insanity-defense standard, the other three obstacles provided 
a great enough challenge to Sneed’s burden of proving insanity that his 
lawyers were still reasonable to pursue a different defense strategy. Johnson, 
600 F.3d at 611. 
107 Id. 
108 Johnson, 2007 WL 709778, at *49. 
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wrongfulness of Sneed’s presence on death row and the 
continuing existence of the same procedural shortcomings 
that put him there in 1986 make this case tragic. 
 
 
 
II.  ADDRESSING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
 
A. Death Penalty Exemptions 
 
Even if the average person might not read Wilcox 
or point specifically to the “legal fiction of binary sanity” 
as the source for the cognitive dissonance they feel, the 
milestone cases and proposed initiatives in the world of 
death penalty jurisprudence demonstrate that most 
people feel the friction between legal culpability and 
moral culpability. The problem for many defendants with 
mental illness is that society has attempted to ease this 
friction by focusing on reducing the consequences of 
convictions for those it deems less culpable, rather than 
seeking to challenge the convictions themselves. 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
culpability for the death penalty in a handful of landmark 
cases, particularly holding unconstitutional the 
executions of the legally-insane,109 the intellectually-
disabled,110 and juveniles.111 When the Court exempted 
the intellectually-disabled from the death penalty, it 
reasoned that “[t]heir deficiencies . . . diminish their 
personal culpability” and that executing them serves none 
of the recognized justifications for the death penalty.112 
The exemption was necessary, according to the Court, 
because although these individuals often know right from 
wrong and are therefore unlikely to succeed with an 
insanity defense, “they have diminished capacities to 
understand and process information, to communicate, to 
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
                                                             
109 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). 
110 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
111 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
112 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The Court went on to explain the executions 
would be “purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering” (quoting 
Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S., 782, 798 (1982)) because the offenders’ 
diminished culpability undermined any retributive purpose of punishment, 
and their cognitive and behavioral impairments made a deterrence purpose 
equally useless. Id. at 318–20. 
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engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand others’ reactions.”113 Moreover, the Court 
stated that these deficiencies posed risks during the 
mitigation phase of both the defendant’s inability to 
properly assist counsel and the jury’s increased likelihood 
to find future dangerousness.114 When the Court 
exempted juveniles from the death penalty in Roper v. 
Simmons,115 it considered characteristics such as 
impulsivity, ill-considered action, and susceptibility to 
peer pressure to be reasons for reduced culpability.116 
However, despite the fact that mentally-ill 
defendants who are not legally insane pose the same 
culpability questions addressed in the cases above, there 
has not yet been any such death penalty exemption for 
“serious mental illness.”117 In 2006, the American Bar 
Association, American Psychiatric Association, American 
Psychological Association, and National Alliance on 
Mental Illness endorsed an exemption based on 
diminished responsibility for defendants with serious 
mental illness, and Mental Health America joined in 
2011.118 Additionally, several states, in addition to Ohio, 
are currently considering legislation to adopt variations of 
this principle, which states: 
Defendants should not be executed or 
sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, 
they had a severe mental disorder or disability 
that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to 
appreciate the nature, consequences or 
wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise 
rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) 
to conform their conduct to requirements of the 
law.119 
 
Because substantial mental illnesses or intellectual 
disabilities put legal culpability into question, it is worth 
asking whether the continued adherence to Wilcox has 
                                                             
113  Id. at 306. 
114 Id. at 320–21. 
115 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
116 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 937 n.177.  
117 Bonnie, supra note 84.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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cost Ohio its ability to “ensure that only the most 
deserving of execution are put to death.”120 
Even though the death penalty exemptions that 
have been made are necessary and right, they still uphold 
the legal fiction of sanity that is so damaging to 
defendants with mental illnesses who won’t see a 
sentence reduction or exemption. In basing these 
exemptions on diminished moral culpability alone, the 
Court supported the idea that somebody whose culpability 
renders them ineligible for the death penalty can still be 
convicted at trial and found to have possessed the 
requisite criminal intent for the crime. Conversely, 
reforms that challenge the assertion that a legally-insane 
person can possess the requisite intent will subsequently 
make intent harder to prove against mentally-ill 
defendants and will necessarily also lead to fairer 
sentences.  A defendant who successfully raises 
reasonable doubts in the jurors’ minds of their ability to 
form the crime’s required intent does not get convicted or 
sentenced; even a defendant who can present such 
evidence to lower the charges ends up with a lower 
sentence by default. 
U.S. law already provides precedent for such 
reforms to take place. Many jurisdictions recognize 
doctrines such as provocation or extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance that can reduce homicide charges 
on the premise that defendants who successfully raise 
this defense were less culpable at the time of their 
crime.121 Additionally, though it applies only to non-
violent offenders, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
allow for sentence reduction in cases where a 
“significantly reduce mental capacity” substantially 
contributed to a crime’s commission.122 Morse classifies 
these efforts as “recogniz[ing] the moral importance of 
‘partial responsibility’ for determining just 
punishment,”123 despite the fact that American 
jurisprudence has not yet followed some European 
nations in adopting this doctrine.124   
                                                             
120 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that executions of 
intellectually-disabled criminals, whom the Court refers to as “mentally 
retarded” criminals, are unconstitutional). 
121 Morse, Mental Disorder, supra note 35, at 935–36.  
122 Id. at 936. 
123 Id. 
124 Arenella, supra note 35, at 829–30. 
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The Wilcox court was skeptical and believed that 
every defendant would take advantage of the opportunity 
to claim a defense of diminished capacity, but already, 
proposed legislation like S.B. 40 is demonstrating how 
legal culpability can be challenged on the basis of mental 
health without opening the door to everyone. It is too 
early to determine how the language of state initiatives 
like S.B. 40 would operate if passed into law, but by 
requiring courts to examine a defendant’s mental capacity 
at the commission of the crime, these bills open the door 
to question legal culpability while still providing an 
exemption for diminished moral culpability. This aspect 
could set them apart from prior death penalty 
exemptions. 
 
B. Proposed Legislation 
 
The Fair Punishment Project that published the 
report on Ohio’s death row125 is not alone in its concerns 
about Ohio. In 2003, the ABA’s Death Penalty Review 
Project assessed a number of states’ capital punishment 
systems to determine their fairness.126 When the ABA’s 
Project released its report in 2007, it “noted that Ohio has 
a significant number of people with severe mental 
disabilities on death row, some of whom were disabled at 
the time of the offense,” and recommended that the state 
adopt a law prohibiting such individuals from receiving 
the death penalty.127 In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court 
and Ohio State Bar Association Joint Task Force to 
Review the Administration of Ohio’s Death Penalty 
(appointed in 2011 to review the ABA’s report) agreed and 
submitted this recommendation, among over fifty others, 
to Chief Justice O’Connor and State Bar Association 
President Marx.128 As a result, Ohio Senate Bill 40 was 
introduced to prohibit defendants found to have a “serious 
mental illness” from receiving the death sentence. 
As currently drafted, the bill defines “serious 
mental illness” (SMI) as a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major 
depressive disorder, or delusional disorder where the 
                                                             
125 The Fair Punishment Project, supra note 12.    
126 JOINT TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE ADMINISTRATION OF OHIO’S DEATH 
PENALTY, FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (April 2014). 
127 Id. at 6. 
128 Id.  
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condition existed at the time of the crime and significantly 
impaired the defendant’s capacity to exercise rational 
judgment about conduct, conform conduct to requirements 
of the law, or appreciate the “nature, consequences, or 
wrongfulness” of conduct.129 A person charged with 
aggravated murder may tell the court before trial that 
they have an SMI, and the court will then require an 
evaluation of the defendant and conduct a pretrial 
hearing to determine whether the condition exists.130 If 
the defendant submits prima facie evidence of the 
condition, the court will presume the condition 
significantly impaired defendant’s capacity at the time of 
the crime, and the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 
contest the diagnosis, rebut the presumption of significant 
impairment, or both.131 If the prosecutor cannot show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the person does not 
have an SMI, then the defendant becomes ineligible for 
the death penalty.132  
One nuance in this proposed legislation is that if 
the court does not find the defendant to have an SMI in 
the pretrial hearing, the defendant may still opt to 
present the matter to the jury.133 The current language 
specifically states that if a defendant chooses to put this 
matter before a jury, any evidence from the pretrial 
hearing may be introduced as well as any other relevant 
evidence to make the case that the condition existed at 
the time of the crime and significantly impaired the 
person’s conduct.134 The bill states simply that this 
evidence may be introduced at “trial,” so it is unclear 
whether that means the guilt phase or the mitigation 
phase. However, the Legislative Service Commission’s bill 
analysis uses “trial” and “sentencing hearing” to refer to 
the two parts of a capital trial, so one can presume the 
proposed legislation would allow the jury to hear this 
                                                             
129 S.B. 40, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 8–9 (Ohio 2017), 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-
SB-40.  
130 Id. at 10.  
131 Id. at 11.  
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 12. 
134 Id. 
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psychiatric evidence and decide the matter of SMI during 
the guilt phase of the trial.135 
The Legislative Service Commission also explains 
that when the court orders an examiner to evaluate the 
defendant, “no statement that a person makes in an 
evaluation ordered . . . relating to the person’s serious 
mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the 
aggravated murder may be used against the person on the 
issue of guilt in any criminal action or proceeding.”136 
However, either side may call the examiner as a witness, 
and the court-ordered evaluation does not preclude either 
side from calling other witnesses to testify on the matter 
of defendant’s SMI.137 It is unclear how the court will 
separate this evidence from evidence on the matter of 
guilt, or if the defendant will actually be allowed to use 
this evidence to challenge the matter of guilt. The bill 
states only that existence of mental illness may not be 
used against the defendant to prove guilt.  
 
III.  RESOLVING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE  
 
A. Advantages of S.B. 40 
 
Disregarding for the moment how this bill might 
conflict with Wilcox, the advantages of this proposal for 
mentally-ill defendants are numerous. The most 
significant aid is that it lowers the burden of proof for 
defendants with the diagnoses listed—instead of making 
defendants prove their mental illness by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the same burden would be on the state to 
disprove it. And instead of forcing defendants to show how 
their mental illness impaired their capacity, the court 
would presume this occurrence. Had this law existed for 
David Sneed, he would have been allowed to introduce 
evidence of his mental illness even though he did not 
plead insanity. At the pretrial hearing, he likely would 
have successfully presented a prima facie case of serious 
mental illness due to his bipolar disorder. The State then 
could have attempted to rebut the presumption that it 
significantly impaired Sneed at the commission of his 
                                                             
135 DENNIS M. PAPP, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION BILL ANALYSIS OF 
S.B. 40, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Ohio 2017), 
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=6453&format=pdf.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 5–6. 
2019]                     Rebutting Binary Sanity  
 
 
369 
crime. Future caselaw will have to determine what factors 
would help the State win that argument; regardless, the 
fact remains this law would have given Sneed more 
defense options and could have saved him from receiving 
the death penalty.   
Furthermore, as mentioned in Part II, it is unclear 
whether S.B. 40 strictly provides death penalty 
exemptions to defendants convicted of aggravated murder 
found to have an SMI, or whether the evidence of an SMI 
could undermine legal culpability in the trial phase if the 
defendant chooses to put the preliminary question of the 
mental illness to the jury. Either way, this bill echoes the 
rationale behind the diminished capacity defense, 
potentially putting it in opposition to Wilcox. 
 
B. Limitations of S.B. 40 
 
Before even getting to Wilcox, the bill does have 
some limitations. First, the limitation to the five 
diagnoses at the beginning automatically means that 
anybody with mental disorders that also impair capacity 
but did not make this list are still forced to choose 
between the insanity defense or mitigation. Furthermore, 
it is unclear what evidence—if any—the jury would be 
allowed to hear on the defendant’s mental illness if the 
court deems the defendant ineligible for the death 
sentence in the pretrial hearing. Evidence of mental 
illness could still act as the aforementioned “double-edged 
sword” the Atkins Court was concerned about and so could 
still affect sentencing even short of the death penalty. 
And, obviously, if this evidence is not allowed to come into 
the guilt phase of the trial at all, this bill does not change 
anything where legal culpability is concerned. 
Finally, the manner in which the prosecution would 
be permitted to rebut the presumption that the mental 
illness impaired capacity could be problematic. Namely, 
allowing the State to use evidence of intent to rebut this 
presumption would be unfair if the State has not yet 
proven intent at trial. This disparity would be even worse 
if the State were able to use this hearing as an additional 
opportunity to discount psychiatric evidence by pointing 
to intent while defendants remain unable to use 
psychiatric evidence to negate intent. To the extent that 
this law creates a partial responsibility-based excuse, 
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intent and sanity will still be separated, so this would not 
occur. But to the extent the bill represents a mens rea 
variant of diminished capacity, the prosecution would 
have an unfair and doctrinally problematic advantage if 
somehow it could negate significant impairment with 
evidence of intent while Wilcox still barred defendants 
from doing the inverse. This inequality would resemble 
the arguably unfair way that capital trial juries in the 
mitigation phase can consider the existence of 
aggravating factors to discount any mitigating mental 
health evidence, even if those aggravating factors (or the 
crime itself) would not have existed but for the 
defendant’s mental health issues.  
Given Wilcox’s apparent rejection of all diminished 
capacity defenses, however, it is difficult to comprehend 
how this precedent could coexist with this law. While the 
law is primarily steeped in partial responsibility 
language, the prosecutor’s ability to rebut the 
presumption of impairment opens the question of mixing 
intent and sanity, which Wilcox expressly prohibited. 
More importantly, as noted above, Wilcox also implicitly 
rejected the partial responsibility doctrine when it 
rejected diminished capacity due to its “blurring” the 
bright line between the sane and the insane. Wilcox would 
also contradict this bill’s trust in psychological evidence to 
diagnose defendants short of insanity. Fortunately, the 
Wilcox opinion ended by echoing Bethea, stating, “If such 
principles are to be incorporated into our law of criminal 
responsibility, the change should lie within the province 
of the legislature.”138   
 
C. Wilcox Revisited  
 
The potential conflicts between S.B. 40 and Wilcox 
gives Ohio a unique opportunity not only to be among the 
first states to pass such a law, but also to revisit this 
nearly 40-year-old case that has impacted so many 
defendants with mental health issues. Indeed, the very 
act of passing S.B. 40 into law would be a rejection of the 
two premises comprising Wilcox, effectively superseding 
Wilcox by statute. There is no question here of preferred 
policy—the proposed legislation instead has proven 
Wilcox wrong. Where the Wilcox court rejected the mens 
                                                             
138 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 533 (quoting Bethea, 365 A.2d at 92). 
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rea variants of diminished capacity, seeking to keep 
psychiatric evidence from proving purposes unrelated to 
the insanity defense,139 the proposed legislation answers 
instead with a solution based on partial responsibility. 
And where the Wilcox court rejected partial responsibility, 
insisting on all-or-nothing sanity tests because it 
distrusted psychological evidence and feared that juries 
could never distinguish between the mental capabilities of 
the legally sane,140 the proposed legislation responds with 
a reliable method by which the court and jury can easily 
separate legally sane defendants with reduced capacity 
from those without. Furthermore, the legislation would 
operate in a world entirely different from 1982—Ohio now 
uses the strictest form of the M’Naghten test for 
insanity,141 intoxication is not as easy to determine as the 
court assumed,142 psychological and psychiatric 
understandings of mental illnesses are nearly forty years 
more developed,143 and, as the David Sneed illustration 
and Harvard report demonstrate, it is now clear capital 
defendants are far from protected.  
But regardless of whether S.B. 40 would operate as 
a diminished capacity defense or not, it is still insufficient 
to bring justice to the overwhelming number of noncapital 
mentally-ill defendants who must choose between the 
rarely successful insanity defense and the rarely helpful 
                                                             
139 Id. at 530 (“In short, the fact that psychiatric evidence is admissible to 
prove or disprove insanity does not necessarily dictate the conclusion that it 
is admissible for purposes unrelated to the insanity defense.”). 
140 See id. at 528–29.  
141 See discussion supra note 2; cf. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 527 (“Having 
satisfied ourselves that Ohio’s test for criminal responsibility adequately 
safeguards the rights of the insane, we are disinclined to adopt an alternative 
defense that could swallow up the insanity defense and its attendant 
commitment provisions.”).    
142 Vars, supra note 25, at 213 (arguing that diagnosing intoxication is not 
straightforward because “diagnoses are usually made retrospectively”; data is 
often self-reported due to unavailable blood, urine, or hair samples; and 
drunk driving is the only crime defined by blood alcohol concentration, 
meaning other crimes lack the ability to perfectly match level of intoxication 
with ability to formulate intent because alcohol affects everyone differently); 
Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 530 (“It takes no great expertise for jurors to determine 
whether an accused was ‘ “so intoxicated as to be mentally unable to intend 
anything (unconscious), ” ’ whereas the ability to assimilate and apply the 
finely differentiated psychiatric concepts associated with diminished capacity 
demands a sophistication . . . that jurors (and offices of the court) ordinarily 
have not developed.”).   
143 See Vars, supra note 25, at 213 (providing research of reliable psychiatric 
diagnoses). 
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mitigation phase.144 Criminal defendants with mental 
illnesses that directly impaired their ability to think or 
act or make decisions at the moment that they committed 
a crime should be allowed to explain this to a jury who 
would otherwise consider them “entirely sane” and judge 
them according to the “reasonable person’s” neurotypical 
standards. Furthermore, the State should not be able to 
essentially assume the presence of a culpable mens rea 
simply because a defendant does not plead insanity and 
cannot offer their real reasons for lacking intent. 
In 1980, an Ohio jury convicted Moses J. Wilcox of 
aggravated burglary and aggravated murder despite 
hearing psychiatrist Dr. Ramos’s expert testimony that he 
had an I.Q. of sixty-eight, a mental age of twelve, 
schizophrenia, and dyslexia; was psychotic, though not 
“mentally ill” under the law; and was “susceptible to 
following the instructions of an authority figure.”145  
Initially, the court found Wilcox to be incompetent to 
stand trial, but after committing him to Lima State 
Hospital for treatment for a few months, the court deemed 
his competency restored.146 
Wilcox had accompanied Jesse Custom to the home 
of their friend, Duane Dixon, ostensibly to buy 
marijuana.147 Conflicting evidence made it unclear 
whether Wilcox and Custom broke into the home to 
burglarize it or whether Dixon let them in, but within 
fifteen to thirty minutes, witnesses heard gunshots and 
Dixon was dead.148 Though Custom was the shooter, 
Ohio’s complicity statute allowed a jury to convict Wilcox 
as if he were the principle offender so long as the evidence 
proved that he aided or abetted the commission of the 
crime with the same intent required by the offense.149 In 
other words, Wilcox’s entire case came down to proving 
his criminal intent. Because he could not use the truth of 
                                                             
144 See supra text accompanying notes 20–22; see also AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT, SEVERE MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 15 (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/crsj/DPDPRP/SevereM
entalIllnessandtheDeathPenalty_WhitePaper.pdf (stating that more than 
half of U.S. inmates—which would represent both noncapital and capital 
defendants—have a mental health diagnosis).  
145 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *6. 
146 Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 523. 
147 Wilcox, 1981 WL 4959, at *1–2. 
148 Id. 
149 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.03(A)(2), (F) (LexisNexis 2016). 
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his cognitive disabilities and mental illness to show the 
jury that there was reasonable doubt as to his ability to 
form the requisite intent, he was convicted and sentenced 
to life in prison. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since 2006, the ABA—in conjunction with the 
American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Psychological Association, and the National Alliance on 
Mental Illness—has opposed the execution of individuals 
with severe mental illness, based on the premise that 
severe mental illness diminishes its victims’ capabilities 
like insanity, intellectual disability, and youthfulness 
do.150 As Justice Kennedy stated in Hall v. Florida, “The 
death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may 
impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must 
have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution 
prohibits their execution.”151 Yet, in order to protect both 
capital and noncapital mentally-ill defendants, the law 
must go beyond its focus on moral culpability in 
sentencing and stop allowing courts to find legal 
culpability based on the fictional idea of binary sanity. 
S.B. 40 could not have helped Wilcox. The insanity 
defense failed him. The legal fiction of binary sanity 
convicted him. And mitigation did not prevent him from a 
lifetime sentence in prison. The only way to truly resolve 
the tension between what should have happened and 
what did happen for Wilcox, Sneed, and many others, is to 
overturn his case and allow both capital and noncapital 
defendants the option to tell the jury the truth.  
 
 
 
                                                             
150 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 144 at 6 (“Although the ABA does 
not take a position supporting or opposing the death penalty generally, its 
policy is based largely on the rationale that the execution of people with 
severe mental illness is inconsistent with our existing legal prohibitions on 
executing people with intellectual disabilities or children under the age of 
18.”).  
151 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 724 (2014) (holding that Florida could not 
define “intellectual disability” using a raw I.Q. test score alone). 
